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Abstract This paper examines the way in which sociology and biology continue 
to struggle to understand why urban life creates high levels of mental disorder. The 
movement of the world population to be majority urban in recent years adds urgency 
to this issue. The paper addresses ways in which sociological analysis and biological 
analysis might work together through the identification of mechanisms, imagined 
and confirmed through data, of the way in which urban life gets ‘under the skin’. The 
argument moves from the use of mechanisms in scientific explanation, to the short-
comings of epidemiology, and the possibility of a new ‘mechanism-rich’ epidemiol-
ogy. It then discusses seven examples of work that might contribute to this effort, 
concluding that more careful ethnography is required.
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Introduction
This paper examines the way in which sociology and biology continue to struggle to 
understand why urban life creates high levels of mental disorder. The movement of 
the world population to be majority urban in recent years adds urgency to this issue. 
The paper addresses ways in which sociological analysis and biological analysis 
might work together through the identification of mechanisms, imagined and con-
firmed through data, of the way in which urban life gets ‘under the skin’. The argu-
ment moves from the use of mechanisms in scientific explanation, to the shortcom-
ings of epidemiology, and the possibility of a new ‘mechanism-rich’ epidemiology. 
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It then discusses seven examples of work that might contribute to this effort, con-
cluding that more careful ethnography is required.
The basic question
The basic question concerns the relationship between urban life and mental disorder, 
and the issue is set out clearly by Van Os, who has been wrestling with it for more 
than 20 years:
Urban environment is one of the (proxy) environmental risk factors for psy-
chotic disorder. … Candidate mechanisms include higher level of perceived 
social isolation in urban areas and greater exposure to social “defeat” occa-
sioned by higher level of competition in cities. (Frissen et al. 2017, p. 2).
This paper, following most research in this field, identifies urban life with social fac-
tors as opposed, for example, to air/noise/light pollution. This is almost universal in 
the literature, and we will follow this convention here. Despite many, many studies 
that have shown an association between mental disorder and urban life in general, 
and indeed between mental disorder and many specific aspects of urban life, it has 
been difficult to identify exactly how urban life ‘gets under the skin’. In their review 
of the biology/sociology interface using urban mental health as the focus, Fitzger-
ald et al. (2016) suggest a new research strategy, to include thickly textured empiri-
cal research, shared sociological and neuropsychiatric attention, thicker ontology of 
urban mental health, and a redrawing of the urban (pp. 151–155). However, it is not 
immediately clear how to put this strategy into practice. One common and manifest 
problem is what counts as knowledge, argument, indeed good science in biology and 
sociology. Since this area of research self-evidently involves both biology and soci-
ology, it follows that we need to work out how our question might be approached 
anew between and within these disciplines.
Sociological and biological mechanisms
One immediate issue is the question as to whether explanations developed in these 
two epistemic communities are compatible. How is research carried on? There are 
a myriad of research questions posed in each discipline, and data collected to throw 
light on them. Both disciplines use sophisticated statistical techniques, to identify 
patterns and associations, and both disciplines also use individual case studies as 
a way of digging into the processes through which particular things work. Each of 
these approaches is perceived to have reciprocal strengths and weaknesses. Associa-
tions do not explain why things ‘go together’. Cases are not generalisable. Within 
each discipline, there have been strong disputes between these two types of research. 
Recently there has been a retreat in both disciplines from the high peaks of ‘cover-
ing laws’, but also from quantitative and qualitative rivalries, to the idea that expla-
nation can be achieved through the identification of ‘mechanisms’ that connect one 
Sociology, biology and mechanisms in urban mental health 
thing with another, but under limited circumstances. It is this development which 
gives us an opportunity and a strategy for re-examining our core question.
Mechanisms are a core part of explanation in biology, often accompanied by 
detailed graphical representation (Bechtel 2013a, b). Indeed, a critical debate about 
the general place of mechanisms in explanatory work has been centred on the case 
of the Nobel prize winning work of Hodgkin and Huxley (1952) on the way in which 
squid neurons fire signals from nerve cell to nerve cell via electrochemical mecha-
nisms (Bogen 2008; Craver 2008; Schaffner 2008; Weber 2008; Levy 2014). Their 
series of papers in 1952 is intriguing because the mathematics worked, but with an 
incomplete mechanism, parts of which were wrong. However, the “diagram of the 
electrical circuit in a membrane and supplemented with details about how mem-
branes and ion channels work, carry considerable explanatory weight. The equations 
without such interpretation … do not constitute the explanation”. (Craver 2008, p. 
1028). Many other examples for biology are listed by Craver and Darden (2013), 
such as cellular transport, cell signalling, DNA repair, and mechanical articulation.
In sociology, the idea of mechanisms is more recent and, at least initially, used in 
rational actor models (Hedström and Swedberg 1998). However, a flourishing litera-
ture has challenged these early ideas to sketch out different varieties of mechanism 
explanation. Gerring (2008, p. 161) outlines nine different uses in social science, and 
Aviles and Reed (2017, p. 728) suggest that ‘‘mechanism warlordism’’ has emerged 
between mechanism fundamentalists (prone to reductionism under the guise of par-
simony), and mechanism metaphorists, who prefer nuance and case studies, and see 
the social world as ‘‘dappled’’ (Cartwright 1999) where only some causes are best 
termed mechanisms. For sociology, the use of mechanism terminology is grow-
ing, with James Mahoney (2001) cataloguing 20 examples from well-known soci-
ologists, reproduced by Margaret Archer in Generative Mechanisms Transforming 
the Social Order (2015). A recent example is the extensive use of mechanisms in 
Scambler and Scambler (2015) in their critique of theoretical faint-heartedness in 
much of the health inequalities literature—yet they offer neither reflection, nor defi-
nition of what they mean by the term ‘mechanism’.
Bechtel and Richardson (1993) argue that decomposition and localisation were 
critical to the development of mechanistic models in the life sciences, drawing 
examples from cell biology, neuroscience, and genetics. Bunge (2004) similarly 
suggests that social science should examine social contexts; break things down into 
their composition, environment, and structure; identify relevant levels and exhibit 
their inter-relations; and look for mechanisms which enable growth or decay.
However, reductionism is neither ubiquitous nor necessary for mechanism con-
struction; indeed Hodgkin and Huxley’s work on the squid neuron “achieved uni-
fication and simplification in … what might be termed “emergent simplifications” 
that transcend the specific workings of the molecular details”. (Schaffner 2008, p. 
1018). After all, mechanisms have to be imagined, and do not spring fully formed 
from the external world. As Mario Bunge comments “imagination both stimulated 
and constrained by data, well-weathered hypotheses … is an art, not a technique” 
(2004, pp. 200–201). Recent work on these ideas has thus been to remove reduc-
tionism, stressing the way in which mechanisms might capture the emergent logic 
of biological and social processes, and to seek a core, simple and non-reductionist 
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definition for a mechanism, for example, proposed by the philosopher Williamson 
(Illari and Williamson 2012): “A mechanism for a phenomenon consists of entities 
and activities organized in such a way that they are responsible for the phenomenon” 
(p. 132).
It is significant that this ‘turn to mechanisms’ in both biology and sociology 
offers a substantial methodological coherence between these disciplines at a time 
when both are themselves concerned to bring about a significant appreciation of the 
impact of each other’s terrain on their core questions—for example, through epige-
netics and neuroplasticity in biology, and through body and health research in soci-
ology. How can this recent convergence help us in our quest to understand urban life 
and mental disorder? What might be the mechanisms?1
Epidemiology, and its limits
Perhaps the first port of call for identifying such mechanisms should be epidemi-
ology, the traditional and still very active unpicking of quantitative associations of 
variables, drawn from both biological and social factors. Epidemiology is typically 
the collection of population-level data to identify risk and protective factors in rela-
tion to health or illness states, with increasingly small risks and increasingly specific 
factors identified through the use of very large samples. The development of ‘big 
data’ promises a new round and extension of this strategy.
The original epidemiological work on mental disorder and urban life was 
developed in the 1930s by Faris and Dunham (1939). Their Chicago data 
showed that schizophrenia was concentrated in the central city area, depression 
scattered across the city, with migrants and singletons having specific psycho-
ses. Their hypotheses were that poor social relations lead to mental disorder, 
that ‘downward drift’ may make a contribution, and that there might be ‘upward 
drift’ of manic depression. In relation specifically to migrants, they suggested 
that ‘adjustment difficulties’ were linked to higher rates of mental disorder, that 
rates were higher for the mobile and heterogeneous, and that rates varied by race 
and by social class. These factors have continued to dominate epidemiological 
work, and indeed have been repeatedly rediscovered in later surveys. Density, 
ethnic mix and social class have re-appeared regularly, but with little sense that 
1 Bhaskar’s work is not referenced here since it is not really taken seriously, indeed rarely referenced, in 
the specialist literature on mechanisms (ie philosophy of science literature) for two reasons. One is that 
his later work really moved away from the clearer arguments of his early work. The second is that it is 
difficult to operationalise what he meant—hence none of the applied literature on mental health uses him 
much either. For example, Pawson (2016) comments that ‘The fundamental difficulty is that Bhaskar was 
a philosopher, writing for philosophers about philosophy, with the consequence that he had little com-
mand of the conduct of empirical research (natural science or social science)’ (pp. 49–50). Similarly, 
Bhaskar is not referenced at all in Jon Williamson’s key paper “What is a mechanism? Thinking about 
mechanisms across the sciences” (Illari and Williamson 2012), nor his latest book (Parkkinen et al. 2018) 
Evaluating Evidence of Mechanisms in Medicine, Principles and Procedures.
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anything new has been said about why these factors are associated. Indeed for 
some authors, this has suggested an impoverished set of ideas:
We have a clear and strong signal telling us urban birth and urban resi-
dence increases the risk of developing schizophrenia. However, the quality 
of the data has not been matched by the quality of the hypotheses. … Let’s 
hope that the next decade of research on urbanicity and schizophrenia will 
be less ataxic and more focused. (Mcgrath and Scott 2006, p. 246)
Since this comment, the number of studies has certainly grown, but the identifi-
cation of why and how there is an association between urban life and mental dis-
order remains elusive. A sample of recent epidemiological studies and reviews 
of factors associated with urban mental disorder includes the following list of 
familiar terms: This sample of papers could be multiplied many times over and 
extended to include genetic, environmental, psychological and historical factors. 
However, in them explanation rarely goes further than statistical association. 
There is almost no discussion of mechanisms to be found here, and the ‘social’ 
is actually measured in some very mundane ways, usually by employment, edu-
cation, income, or social ties, with no real unpacking of what ‘social’ experience 
means in any detail.
An example is provided by some work arguably at the forefront of this kind of 
analysis (Schofield et al. 2016). This paper examines ‘minority status and men-
tal distress’, using sophisticated statistical analysis. But the data are reduced to 
very imprecise categories, for example, ‘occupational social class’ is coded to 
a binary variable “advantaged (professional, managerial and technical, skilled 
non-manual and skilled manual) and disadvantaged (partly skilled, unskilled and 
unemployed) groups”. (p. 3053). The data are subjected to sophisticated quanti-
tative analysis, yet the authors themselves comment that
we were restricted to fairly crude definitions of minority status to achieve 
statistical power. Our definition of occupational social class was, by neces-
sity, crude as we had to match classes at individual and area levels meas-
ured on different scales. Also comparison with the social class measure 
is hindered by the amount of missing data, 247 (15%) missing responses, 
whereas this was negligible for the other measures. Our measure of single 
household status is also, by necessity, crude. For example, it could miss 
those who effectively live alone but are in shared households, due to eco-
nomic necessity. (pp. 3055–56)
This combination of weak data with sophisticated numerical analysis is common 
in this literature.
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Towards a new epidemiology?
Criticisms have grown of the multiplication of increasingly sophisticated data han-
dling and modelling, but without a concomitant growth in explanation of how typi-
cal risks and protections work in practice. A leading social epidemiologist, Sandro 
Galea, comments:
The body of work in the field that has explored how truly large-scale (macro-
level) forces shape the health of populations remains disproportionately lim-
ited….. A concern with the influence of urbanicity must, of necessity, involve 
samples that are heterogeneous across urban contexts and involve large sam-
ples that are collected across cities (Galea and Link 2013, p. 844)
He argues that epidemiology devotes too little attention to the mechanisms through 
which social factors enter the biological realm. He suggests the successful exam-
ples, smoking and papilloma virus, are rare, and that this is singularly not the 
case for urbanicity and mental disorder, which lacks a convincing elaboration of 
mechanisms.
(Galea and Link 2013) continues his argument through characterising epidemiol-
ogy as a “black-box” discipline, focussing on factors that “may lead to the isolation 
of spurious associations or a chase for associations where there are none”. His alter-
native is a “deeper grounding in a theory of the production of population health that 
stands on its own. With a few notable exceptions, epidemiology remains quite poor 
in this regard”. (p. 847). More recently (in Keyes and Galea 2017), he has contrasted 
traditional epidemiology (seeking to identify whether exposure (e.g. urbanicity) is 
associated with disease), with what he terms ‘causal architecture’ (designed to iden-
tify the mechanisms that underlie disease).
In the same vein, the Harvard social epidemiologist Nancy Krieger (2011) 
has argued strongly for a move away from the dominant biomedical and lifestyle 
approaches in social epidemiology, which emphasise individual-level causes, 
towards an ‘ecosocial theory’ which includes the social, ecological and historical 
context. In short, epidemiology needs some social theory (Wemrell et  al. 2016). 
Wemrell et al. suggest three areas in urgent need of theorisation: macro-social deter-
minants of health and disease, categories of human difference, and embodiment.
Mechanisms: in practice
What work on urban life and mental disorder comes closer to Galea’s causal archi-
tecture by seeking to identify mechanisms? We can review seven strategies.
Strategy 1: Include everything: ‘NEM III R’
How can we link the huge scale differences between urban political economy and 
molecular biology that might be involved in urban mental health? The NEM III R 
(Network Episode Model) of the causes of mental disorder has been developed by 
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sociologist Pescosolido over the last 25 years. Starting from a fairly simple model 
of patient networks, demographics and support systems (1991), she has extended it 
in NEM II to include the treatment system, and in NEM III to include the biological 
system (Pescosolido 2006, 2011; Perry and Pescosolido 2015).
This approach was developed explicitly to integrate the biological and social, 
through the specification of four basic requirements:
(1) “Consider and articulate the full set of contextual levels documented to have 
impact.
(2) Offer an underlying mechanism or ‘engine of action’ that connects levels.
(3) Employ a metaphor and analytic language familiar to both social and natural 
science.
(4) Understand the need for and use the full range of methodological tools”. (Pes-
cosolido 2006, p. 194).
The model broadly includes a time dimension covering an individual’s life course, 
and a number of analytic levels, connected by networks, ranging across the bio-
logical, personal, social and system levels. In this sense, it is widely inclusive, but 
although the NEM model is strong in sensitising us to all the factors and levels 
which might be important, it is less clear about how to determine which mechanisms 
are the key ones. This is not just an empirical issue, as it is still not clear where to 
look. Pescosolido’s answer is to follow the actors and their networks:
the entire process is dynamic, constituted, and embedded in individuals’ social 
networks. What individuals know, how they evaluate the potential efficacy and 
suitability of a range of options and providers, and what they do (in what order 
and under which “tone”) are fundamentally tied to, negotiated in, and given 
meaning through social interactions. (Pescosolido 2011, p. 45)
However, it should be noted that ‘social interactions’ is still biology-light. Actors 
here do not include the materialities of molecules, cells, membranes, and biological 
systems and structures. Despite her claim to the contrary, Pescosolido’s approach is 
really quite thin on biology, and it occupies relatively little space in her work. She 
does not follow the actors ‘all the way down’ in the way so notable in actor network 
theory (Latour 2005, p. 52).
Strategy 2: Cut through on a clear path: SES as a ‘fundamental cause’
NEM excels at bringing all possible factors to bear, but how do we find the network 
connections between levels that are active mechanisms? An alternative strategy is to 
cut a clear path through the myriad of possible factors with one major explanatory 
mechanism. This was proposed by Link and Phelan with the idea of ‘fundamental 
cause’.
Urban life is a major multiplier of inequality: just as the world population has 
now become majority urban, inequalities grow all around the world (Amin 2007; 
Scambler and Scambler 2015). Urban life accumulates both the richest and the 
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poorest. Even a cursory glance at the list of recent epidemiological studies of the 
social (Table  1) shows a common theme of disadvantage, deprivation, isolation, 
fragmentation, and discrimination. These are overlapping aspects of inequalities of 
income, status and power manifest in a variety of ways. Link and Phelan (1995) have 
suggested that (unequal) socio-economic status (SES) could be conceptualised as 
a fundamental cause (mechanism) of ill health (and of course by definition, good 
health). They do not suggest that SES stands in for a number of known and unknown 
specific mechanisms, but is in itself a dominant mechanism for understanding the 
experience of ill health (including of course mental ill heath). Even if specific dis-
eases and therapies come and go, they argue that SES will continue to exercise dom-
inance, as those with more resources gain disproportionate access to new healthcare 
and disproportionately avoid health risks. Resources, they predict, can 
help individuals avoid diseases and their negative consequences through 
a variety of mechanisms. Thus, even if one effectively modifies intervening 
mechanisms or eradicates some diseases, an association between a fundamen-
tal cause and disease will re-emerge. As such, fundamental causes can defy 
efforts to eliminate their effects when attempts to do so focus solely on the 
mechanisms that happen to link them to disease in a particular situation. (Link 
and Phelan 1995, p. 81).
Over the subsequent 20 years, this prediction seems to have held up. Assessing the 
evidence that has accumulated in four areas, they suggest (Phelan et al. 2010) that 
SES does indeed shape disease outcomes via various risk factors, through the differ-
ential deployment of resources, a pattern which is very stable and reproduced over 
time via the emergence and decay of intervening mechanisms. This clearly leads in 
exactly the opposite direction from contemporary epidemiological sophistication—
there is little point in identifying more and more (and smaller) risk and protective 
Table 1  Social epidemiologies of urban life
Socio-economic status, ethnicity, migration—and their intersection (Goodwin et al. 2017)
Social disadvantage, isolation and function (Morgan et al. 2017)
Socio-economic status and social inclusion (Yi and Liang (2017)
Social isolation and social “defeat” (Frissen et al. 2017)
Social minority status—ethnicity, household, social class (Schofield et al. 2016)
Social disadvantage (Stilo 2016)
Social status, social support, and racial discrimination (Mama et al. 2016)
Social networks, social support, and ethnicity (Smyth et al. 2015)
Social network structure and culture (Perry and Pescosolido 2015)
Social deprivation, social support, discrimination, stress, trust (Wickham et al. 2014)
Social coherence, density of social networks, and population density (Lederbogen et al. 2013)
Social adversity, population density, social fragmentation and deprivation (Heinz et al. 2013)
Social ties, social support, and stress buffering (Thoits 2011)
Socio-economic status, social capital, and social disorder (Kim 2008)
Social fragmentation, social isolation and social inequality (Van Os 2004)
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factors with larger and larger samples, if there is an underlying mechanism gener-
ated by SES that over time continues to reproduce ill health.
As originally defined and subsequently used, the term ‘resources’ is ambiguous. 
While Link and Phelan continue to emphasise resources, since wealth and money 
income will unequally confer potential and actual agency, it should be noted that 
other classical elements of SES, such as power, status, geographical clustering, and 
cultural habitus (including language) are likely parts of this mechanism, and indeed 
have been partially identified as such in a detailed ethnography exploring a funda-
mental cause analysis of diabetes in the USA (Lutfey and Freese 2005—discussed 
further below). In this respect, Link and Phelan’s strategy is a case of “emergent 
simplification” mentioned at the beginning of this paper, where Schaffner (2008, p. 
1018) discusses how to “transcend the specific workings of the molecular details”.
Strategy 3: Social psychology of small groups
Another strategy has been to try to identify mediators between the social and the 
biological levels. Not as rigid as the ‘fundamental cause’ approach, these are the 
very small scale interactions that shape capacities and emotions. An example is 
research developed from the work of Henry Tajfel (1981) in the 1950s, aiming to 
understand stereotyping of Jewish people in WWII though the concept of ‘every-
day’ or mundane categorisation, rather than the personal prejudices of the powerful. 
He focussed on the process of prejudice and stereotyping arising from the social 
judgements that people are typically hard wired to make in small groups. He showed 
that people’s sense of identity is strongly influenced by the group in which they find 
themselves, and the way in which groups are categorised. There are similarities here 
to Goffman’s (1986) work on stigma, and Scheff’s (1974) work on labelling. In all 
three approaches, the individual both creates and receives categorical judgements 
about themselves and others in terms of the group context in which they find them-
selves (Phelan et al. 2008).
Indeed it is argued in this ‘self-categorization theory’ (Turner 1987) that there 
is a strong desire in people to ask ‘who am I?’ and to answer this through their 
perception of the groups they are in. While those making these judgments may 
strengthen their own identity in this way, the consequence for people who are so 
judged can be considerable. This may range from material exclusion (for example, 
from employment, housing), to ‘social defeat’ and shame—a particular experience 
for people with mental disorder, migrant status, and ethnic minority status (Reader 
et al. 2015). While much work in this area is based on animal studies, Reader et al. 
explore a number of ways in which the experience of social defeat ‘gets under the 
skin’ and into the brain via the hypothalamic–pituitary–adrenal (HPA) system. The 
link to urban mental health would be the way in which cities both destabilise the 
fixed social groups of rural life, and in addition multiply the opportunities, divisions 
and expectations for those who move to the city.
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Strategy 4: Social capital
The expanded conceptualisation of resources to include power, status, geographi-
cal clustering, and cultural habitus (including language), suggested by Lutfey and 
Freese (2005) above, is very close to another recent and increasingly common con-
ceptualisation of ‘the social’—social capital. While fundamental cause research 
resonates with the gloomy list of disadvantages and deprivations in Table 1, there 
is another rapidly growing literature on the mechanisms of social capital that might 
protect against mental disorder.
In a parallel development to the fundamental cause literature since the 1990s, 
social capital has come to embrace a bewildering variety of aspects of the social 
(Moore and Kawachi 2016). In a systematic review of the effects of social capital 
on mental health, De Silva et  al. (2005) observe that social capital might include 
‘cognitive, structural, bridging, bonding, and linking’ types, drawn from the very 
different theoretical traditions of Pierre Bourdieu, James Coleman and Robert Put-
nam. However, in the tradition of epidemiological evidence synthesis these are hap-
pily combined into a review as if they (more or less) extracted elements of a com-
mon underlying reality. Ten years later a further review (focussed on young people) 
illustrates the wide range of ideas that have been drawn under the idea of social 
capital (Table 2): 
McPherson concludes not unreasonably that “It is, therefore, important that 
future research seeks to uncover the mechanisms through which social capital may 
exert different influences on the mental health” (p. 13).
Strategy 5: Interaction ritual chains
While Pescosolido emphasises what people know and what they do, as the core 
aspects of social interactions, and Link and Phelan emphasise the deployment of 
resources, and social capital stresses the social context, there is further aspect of 
social life which hardly appears in these approaches. This is the point that there are 
Table 2  Diverse social capitals that affect mental health of young people
Family structure (e.g. number of parents present in the household)
Quality of parent–child relations (e.g. parent–child communication)
Adult interest in the child (e.g. parental involvement with school)
Parent’s monitoring of the child (e.g. perceptions of parental monitoring/control)
Extended family support and exchange (e.g. perceptions of extended family support)
Social support networks (e.g. peer support)
Civic engagement in local institutions (e.g. volunteering)
Trust and safety (e.g. trust in others)
Religiosity (e.g. attendance at religious services)
Quality of the school (e.g. school cohesion and relationship between teachers and pupils)
Quality of neighbourhood (e.g. neighbourhood cohesion and social control) (McPherson et al. 2014)
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important mental health consequence of the emotions generated by the way people 
live their lives in close and intimate proximity to one another. For example, stress is 
generated by high levels of negative emotional expression in families and, by con-
trast, trauma can result from low levels of emotional expression (e.g. neglect or iso-
lation). There is evidence that both are bad for mental health (Koutra et al. 2014; 
Norman et al. 2012).
Sociological work on mechanisms that might analyse the effect of small/intimate 
groups such as families on emotions has been developed by Randall Collins and 
others on violence (2009) and ‘interaction ritual chains’ (2005) combining the tradi-
tions of Darwin, Durkheim and Goffman. Collins argues that we are biologically 
predisposed to emotional contagion in small group settings through physical and 
psychological rhythmic entrainment (resonance) which generates positive (or nega-
tive) emotional states, creating or releasing emotional stress (Fig. 1). 
The biological roots of this mechanism he suggests are shared with non-human 
animals:
We have things of considerable importance to incorporate from Darwin and 
ethology. First and foremost is the proposition that society is subhuman. Many 
animals live in groups just as we do. The distinctively human forms of cogni-
tion and communication are built on top of the pre-existing capacity for social 
bonds; they are not the basis of it. (Collins 1975, p. 92, italics original)
Goffman, similarly, recognised that sociality is “located in a physical, biological, 
and social world” (Goffman 1974, p. 247). However, the biological pathways from 
bodies to rhythmic entrainment are not clear from Collins. One interesting possibil-
ity has been suggested by Heinskou and Liebst (2016), through the polyvagal para-
sympathetic part of the autonomic nervous system. This, they observe, is the neural 
pathway that regulates a number of internal organs, including the heart. It is phylo-
genetically the most recent subsystem and is connected to social communication, 
compared to the second oldest (fight-flight) and oldest (freezing or death feigning). 
RITUAL INGREDIENTS RITUAL OUTCOMES
common
acon or
event
(including stereotyped 
formalies)
transient
emoonal smulus
group assembly
(bodily co-presence)
barriers to outsiders
mutual focus of 
aenon
shared mood
feedback 
intensificaon through 
rhythmic entrainment
collecve 
effervescence
group solidarity
emoonal energy 
in individual
symbols of social 
relaonship
(sacred objects)
standards of 
morality
righteous anger for 
violaons
Fig. 1  Interaction ritual chains (adapted from Collins 2005, p. 48)
 N. Manning 
In short, they suggest that this mechanism might connect the Collins model with the 
polyvagal system, genuinely bringing the biological and social together.
Strategy 6: Biology led mechanism
Biological mechanisms have so far only been touched on. To move further in that 
direction, we can consider mechanisms that place biology more centrally. Pesco-
solido (2006, p. 194) suggested earlier that in seeking mechanisms it might be pos-
sible to ‘employ a metaphor and analytic language familiar to both social and natural 
science, so as to facilitate synergy’. Arroyo-Santos (2011) suggests that in biology 
‘the metaphor is a tool used to fulfill three major goals: 1) as an epistemic device 
seeking to provide a satisfactory explanation, 2) as an inferential device that can help 
infer new aspects of the phenomenon under investigation, 3) as an important theory-
construction device’. (p. 89). It has already been noted from Bechtel (2013a, b) that 
the mechanisms that are a core part of explanation in biology are often accompanied 
by detailed graphical/metaphorical representation—indeed diagrams can be argued 
to be part of a full biological explanation. We should start therefore with a comment 
on metaphors and images in biology.
Biology has been particularly rich in the use of vivid metaphors and diagrams 
as a way of realising possible and actual mechanisms in various fields of its work. 
Hodgkin and Huxley represented their mechanism through a mathematical formula 
and electrical circuit used as a proxy mechanism for the squid neuron. The vagal 
nerve discussed earlier in relation to interaction ritual chains is frequently embed-
ded in diagrams that link brain function to external stress, the HPA system and the 
gut microbiome. There are a number of common biological metaphors found in the 
literature, of which five are prominent. Table 3 suggests how they might be related 
to social and biological mechanisms.
The most common mechanism/metaphor to be found in the biology led literature 
on urban life is the proposal that external stressors (trauma, poverty, etc.) are inva-
sive, or at least signal the need for biological changes. The use of this concept of 
stress is now almost universal. However, it has not always been so—indeed stress 
would be an excellent example of JS Mill’s celebrated warning not “to believe that 
whatever received a name must be an entity or being, having an independent exist-
ence of its own” (Mill 1869, footnote 2). In a recent Wellcome project on the history 
of stress, Mark Jackson (2012, 2013, 2014, 2015) suggests that although the concept 
of stress was used in the late nineteenth century, it only became widely adopted after 
the second world war in the UK. Used initially to explain an upsurge in ulcers and 
other stomach disorders, it was taken up in psychiatry as war time migration and the 
newly established health and social services revealed the kind of lives that poorer 
people led.
The classic paper underpinning the modern era of stress research is McEwen and 
Stellar (1993), in which stress is described in the first paragraph as “physical stress-
ors such as exertion, heat, cold, trauma, infection, and inflammation; psychologic 
stressors such as fear and anxiety, social defeat and humiliation, disappointment, and 
sometimes even intense joy” (p. 2093). Significantly, stress is not described in any 
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further detail, but summarised as physical or psychological stimulus which threatens 
the individual. ‘Allostatic load’ is further defined as the accumulated ‘wear and tear’ 
of adjusting the natural balance (allostasis) such as heart rate, to threats over time.
However, Jackson’s history raises the question, does stress really exist, and if so, 
what is it? The conceptualisation and measurement of stress, and its impact on allo-
static load, is central. However, there is little clear idea of how this accumulation 
mechanism actually works, nor the units in which it might be measured. Allostatic 
load is now conventionally elaborated to include environment, life events, and early 
trauma, such that childhood trauma from many years earlier is added together with 
concurrent experiences, such as travelling though the city as measured by moment-
by-moment mobile technology, as illustrated by McEwan here (Fig. 2): 
Three approaches have been used to elaborate the evidence for such stress 
mechanisms. One is to measure external social stressors and allostatic load 
in population surveys. Two comprehensive reviews suggest that this evidence 
has yet to be found. Dowd et al. (2009) conclude on the basis of the 26 studies 
they found that “Current empirical evidence linking SES [socio-economic sta-
tus] to cortisol and AL (allostatic load) is weak. Future work should standard-
ise approaches to measuring SES, chronic stress and cortisol to better understand 
these relationships”. (p. 1297). (Cortisol level is the standard biomarker used to 
measure stress response). In a further recent review of studies since 2009, John-
son et al. (2017) state that “the scope of this review was limited to the biological 
internalization of SEP [socio-economic position] and the effects of this stressor 
on AL, highlighting AL as a mechanism on the causal pathway between SEP and 
health outcomes” (p. 1). The authors report that a total of the 59 different bio-
markers were used in one or more of the 26 studies they found. The number of 
biomarkers used to create an AL index ranged between 6 and 25. There were 20 
different biomarker combinations observed across the 26 studies included in the 
literature review. They conclude by observing how struck they were by the sub-
stantial inconsistency in biomarkers used to operationalise AL, and also by the 
lack of fidelity to its original conception as an index of biological response to 
Environmental stressors
(work, home, and neighbourhood)
Major life events Trauma, abuse
Individual differences (genes, 
development, and experience)
BRAIN
Perceived stress
(threat no threat)
(helplessness)
(vigilance)
Behavioural responses
(fight or flight)
(personal behaviour – diet, 
smoking, drinking, 
exercise)
Physiologic
responses
Allostasis Adaptaon
Allostac load
Fig. 2  How the environment ‘gets under the skin’ (adapted from McEwen et al. 2015, p. T71)
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stress. They argue it is difficult to know what is being measured by AL, or inter-
pret findings about the association between SEP and AL.
The second approach is to induce stress in experimental events, as a proxy for 
the stress of ‘urbanicity’, and correlate this with experience of past or current 
urban living. A widely used approach is to subject experimental subjects to a 
situation of unfamiliarity and perceived social judgement, such as public speak-
ing. This is associated with changes in cortisol levels in the blood, and seems 
robust. Using cortisol levels as a measure of stress in studies of mental disorder 
has become common—they are fairly easy to evaluate from saliva. However, the 
use of cortisol to measure stress raises a very real danger of circularity, in which 
stress is itself defined in terms of cortisol, since there is little reflection in the 
literature on whether public speaking is the ‘same’ stress as adverse life events, 
or childhood trauma, or urban living and whether those get ‘under the skin’ in the 
same way.
An example which has recently become widely influential is a study of how urban 
living and upbringing affect ‘neural social stress processing’ (Lederbogen et  al. 
2011). Two stress measures are used: the “Montreal Imaging Stress Task (MIST), 
a social stress paradigm where participants solve arithmetic tasks under time pres-
sure” (p. 498) and a similar test in which “subjects performed two cognitive tasks 
(arithmetic and mental rotation) while being continuously visually exposed to dis-
approving investigator feedback through video” (p. 499). This is assumed to be a 
model of urban social stress, such that the authors conclude with the “parsimonious 
proposal that social stress contributes causally to the impact of urbanicity on the 
neural circuits identified” (p. 500). In a final flourish, they suggest that
Beyond mental illness, our data are of general interest in showing a link 
between cities and social stress sensitivity. This indicates that an experimen-
tal approach … could be used to characterize further … the effects of finer-
grained quantifiers of individuals’ social networks or individual social experi-
ence in urban contexts. One such potential component is unstable hierarchical 
position. (p. 500, italics added).
These findings were not replicated in a subsequent study explicitly linked to the 
Lederbogen study, which used two different stress tests (Steinheuser et  al. 2014). 
The Trier Social Stress Test asked subjects to “recall a list of 50 previously learned 
items in front of an audience” (p. 679). The Socially Evaluated Cold Pressor Test 
asked subjects to “immerse their right hand up to and including the wrist for 3 min 
(or until they could not tolerate it any more) into ice water”. (p. 679).
It is a long extrapolation from such tests to an argument that the same stress is 
produced by an ‘unstable hierarchical position’, and it remains unclear how such 
psychosocial components create stress in the field, and how it is to be measured.
A third approach has been the development of a model of the ‘the social brain’ 
by Cacioppo in social neuroscience, looking at the consequences of social experi-
ence on the brain. The key area for his work has been the consequence of lone-
liness, i.e. the absence of the social, on brain function. Moreover, the key studies 
here have been with animals rather than humans, and the definition of the social is 
very limited. In a long review of ‘Social Neuroscience: Progress and Implications 
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for Mental Health’, Cacioppo et  al. (2007, p. 106), for example, define the social 
as ‘social behaviour’, which is classified into four subcategories of self-perception, 
self-regulation, interpersonal perception, and group processes. However,, the fourth 
type, group processes, is dealt with in merely one sentence in this long and detailed 
review: “The stigma of physical and mental illness operates at the group or collec-
tive level of analysis” (p. 109). This is a substantial failure to grasp or work with the 
reality of human society, and a misleading use of the term social in ‘social neurosci-
ence’ and the ‘social brain’.
In relation to stress, this lopsided approach continues in a recent comprehen-
sive review of stress and the ‘social brain’. Sandi and Halle (2015) open as fol-
lows: “Stress (defined in this Review as the activation of the neurophysiological 
stress response) helps organisms to cope” (p. 290). Stress as a concept is thus col-
lapsed into neurophysiological change, rather than separately theorised and meas-
ured. Stress becomes the neurophysiological response, rather than the social expe-
rience. Thus, the conceptualisation and measurement of stress arising from social 
life continues to prove elusive in practice. They comment that most of the studies 
they review are from animal studies (rodents), and thus stress is read off from small 
games and situations created for rodents to react to (p. 292). In common with the 
Lederbogen study (above), this is almost exclusively an animal-based review, which 
has equivocal findings, yet this has not inhibited the reviewers from concluding with 
an unsubstantiated and massive projection into human social life that
If stress that is caused by social disputes — such as war, physical abuse or 
aberrant socioeconomic inequalities — exacerbates antisocial dispositions in 
individuals, it may be instrumental in the development of spirals of violence 
(p. 300) (italics added)
What is to be done?
Mechanisms connecting urban life to mental disorder are both everywhere and elu-
sive. Hundreds of papers are being produced looking at dozens of different vari-
ables, measured in different ways. Is there progress? And if so, what might this 
mean? How can we know more about urban life and mental disorder?
The key concept of stress is variable and unstable in its definition, and the social 
aspects of urban life are poorly articulated. While the proposal from Galea of a more 
theorised causal architecture is the right direction in which to move, this requires 
that the elements are clear; yet we see that in the literature to date too much of it 
either under- or miss-specifies both the nature of stress and the ‘social’. The archi-
tecture, to continue that metaphor, requires a more careful scaffolding. Wimsatt 
(2014), for example, suggests three types of ‘scaffolding’ are necessary to underpin 
such concepts and their interrelations. He defines scaffolds as the “means through 
which other structures or competencies are constructed or acquired by individuals 
or organizations … scaffolding for individuals, scaffolding for organizations, infra-
structural scaffolding” (pp. 86–87). For example, individuals live their lives in a 
myriad of small face to face groups, such as families, friends, schools, associations, 
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work teams, churches; they are also embedded in legal and administrative contexts, 
travel and distribution networks, and work organisations; underpinning all of which 
are infrastructures such as language, travel networks, information sources, shopping 
centres, networks for gas, water, power, telephone and waste removal. All of these 
are aspects of the social context within which stress is experienced. Yet very lit-
tle of this kind of scaffolding appears in the papers reviewed so far, which could 
be applied not only to the lived experience of being in the city, but also the ways 
in which possible biological sub-systems work. As Krieger has put it more bluntly, 
“psychosocial analyses accord less attention, theoretically and empirically, to who 
and what generated psychosocial insults and buffers” (p. 198).
A key issue here is the idea that mechanisms are not merely aggregates of fac-
tors, or elements of scaffolds, but that they capture ‘emergent’ properties that are 
organised in very specific ways. Craver and Tabery (2017) distinguish between 
mechanistic (or organisational) emergence, whereby elements are arranged together 
in quite specific ways, and epistemic emergence, meaning that it is not possible to 
predict the properties of wholes from properties of the parts. In both cases, we need 
to seek out the relationship between urban lives, stress, and mental disorder in terms 
of mechanisms which are more than an aggregate of factors identified through statis-
tical associations.
Given the under-specification of stress and the social, we suggest that detailed 
ethnography is now necessary to access urban experience which is associated with 
mental disorder, keeping an open mind as to what the lived experience of people 
might be. An example is Lutfey and Freese’s (2005) ethnography of diabetes as an 
elaboration of the fundamental cause mechanism discussed earlier. In some ways, 
diabetes could be a proxy for mental disorder: it is a major cause of morbidity and 
mortality, with prevalence increasing dramatically; it is a long-term illness whose 
treatment depends heavily on patient self-management; it is related to SES; com-
plications are known about. This simplifies the work of identifying potential mech-
anisms within an ethnographic inquiry (ibid, pp. 1332–1333). Their own model 
is (Fig. 3): 
Central locus 
of mechanism
Aributed 
locaon
Perceived disposional 
Impediments
Inside the 
clinic (I)
Connuity of care
In-clinic educaonal resources
Division of labour among physicians
External (II) Financial limitaons
Occupaonal constraints
Social support networks
Outside 
clinic
Apparent 
movaon (III)
Costs of compliance
Relave magnitude of 
lifestyle adjustments
Disposional
Apparent 
cognive ability (IV)
Interaconal differences
Capacies as praccal 
achievements
Fig. 3  An ethnography of diabetes mechanisms (adapted from Lutfey and Freese 2005, p. 1339)
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Their goal is to use ethnography to “articulate some of the mechanisms by which 
the inverse relationship between SES and health outcomes might be produced 
among persons with diabetes” (p. 1361).
Knowing that migration, ethnicity, poverty, density, pollution, noise and so on 
might be sources of urban stress, we have set up a major ESRC-funded ethnography 
of migrant workers in Shanghai to see what we might understand about the scaffolds 
surrounding their urban life and mental (di)stress. Our aim is to create a novel deep-
surveying instrument for wider use on the (global) social epidemiology of urban 
mental health, and to inform strategies to address development priorities. Examples 
of such ethnography in support of innovative epidemiology can be found for hygiene 
(Larrea-Killinger et al. 2013), teen pregnancy (Béhague et al. 2008) and health seek-
ing (Freidenberg et al. 1993).
By way of a conclusion
In an open letter to the actor Stephen Fry, who discussed frankly on television his 
own struggle for mental health, Richard Bentall (2016) wrote
a wide range of social and environmental factors increase the risk of mental ill 
health …
poverty, urban environments, migration, ethnicity, early separation from par-
ents, childhood sexual, physical and emotional abuse, bullying in schools, 
debt, unhappy marriages, demanding work, unemployment, to name but a few.
And he concluded that the “biggest cause of human misery is miserable relation-
ships with other people, conducted in miserable circumstances”.
But where does this leave us? It is far easier to question the factors, elements, 
mechanisms, associations etc. of others than to create something new. What is 
stress? Social capital? Socio-economic status? How do the microbiome, vagal 
nerves, and the HPA axis interact? What is and how does trauma work? Even if we 
understood these processes completely, what could we do? One way we might think 
about this is by turning in the other direction, away from the damages that urban 
life inflicts, towards an “urban utopianism based around four registers of solidarity 
woven around the collective basics of everyday urban life. These are ‘repair’, ‘relat-
edness’, ‘rights’ and ‘re-enchantment’ (Amin 2006, p. 1009). Perhaps these could be 
the inspiration for new ways of thinking.
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